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Abstract:	Agroforestry	is	a	land	management	system	long	practiced	by	communities	in	the	Moluccas.	The	
practice	 is	 commonly	 known	 as	 "Dusung",	 where	 one	 cash	 crop	 in	 particular,	 nutmeg,	 is	 interspersed	
throughout	farmer	groves.	Farmers	have	faced	a	number	of	challenges	in	recent	years,	especially	concerning	
a	system	of	debt	bondage	inflicting	undue	losses	upon	them.	This	study	aims	to	explain	the	involvement	of	
farmers	within	the	debt	bondage	system,	otherwise	known	as	the	tree	mortgage	system.	We	utilize	a	case	
study	methodology,	whereby	data	were	collected	through	interviews	and	participant	observation	and	results	
analyzed	using	principal	agent	theory.	Findings	highlight	that	nutmeg	farmers,	what	we	call	the	Principal,	
incur	high	risks	when	debt	bondage	is	applied	by	an	Agent	that	has	the	increasing	ability	to	deny	and	change	
the	 terms	 of	 an	 agreement.	 This	 occurs	 when	 Agents	 exploit	 information	 unavailable	 to	 farmers	 about	
nutmeg	marketing	prospects,	which	weakens	farmer	negotiating	positions.	Improving	institutional	support	
for	contracts	in	the	tree	mortgage	system	could	help	to	ensure	a	more	equitable	arrangement,	improving	
the	 terms	 for	 nutmeg	 farmers,	 meanwhile	 also	 encouraging	 the	 continued	 preservation	 of	 the	 dusung	
system,	which	has	long	helped	to	manage	forest	resources	sustainably.	
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1.	Introduction	
Agroforestry	 has	 long	 been	 practiced	 for	 generations	 by	 people	 in	 the	Moluccas	 Islands,	 a	
system	known	regionally	as	"Dusung".	This	land	use	patterns	combines	crop	farming	(agriculture)	
and	forest	trees	(forestry)	in	the	same	area	and	is	managed	over	time.	One	of	the	most	important	
perennial	plant	species	introduced	by	communities	in	the	Dusung	system	is	nutmeg	(Myristica	sp).	
According	 to	 (Silaya.Th,	 Tjoa	 M,	 Lelloltery	 H,	 Siahaya	 L,	 Bone	 I,	 2012)	 nutmeg	 is	 native	 to	 the	
Moluccas	 Islands	 and	 has	 long	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 global	 economy	 since	 the	Dutch	
colonial	era.	Even	today	the	world	demand	for	nutmeg	remains	very	high.	
The	Moluccas	Islands,	as	a	regional	hub	of	nutmeg	production	with	the	highest	quality,	has	an	
important	 role	 in	 the	 global	 economy	 of	 nutmeg.	 Unfortunately,	 most	 nutmeg	 farmers	 in	 the	
Moluccas	Islands	remain	below	the	poverty	line.	According	to	data	from	the	(Dinas	Pertanian	Prov	
Maluku,	2012)	community	plantation	on	nutmeg	commodity	in	Moluccas	province	has	a	total	area	
of	22,271	ha	with	a	total	production	of	2,347	tons	and	productivity	of	337.56	kg	/	ha.	The	number	
of	nutmeg	farmers	also	increased	from	17,173	people	in	2008	to	20,199	people	in	2010.	
National	and	regional	efforts	to	increase	community	forestry	schemes	has	presented	a	fresh	
new	 focus	 for	 potential	 government	 support.	 Such	 changes	 present	 opportunities	 for	 new	
mechanisms	to	support	access	provision	on	community-based	sustainable	forest	management	to	
increase	 participation	 of	 local	 communities	 in	 forest	 management,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 potential	 for	
increasing	 community	 incomes	 in	 the	 forestry	 sector.	 This	 juncture	 of	 policy	 developments	
therefore	 require	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 the	 infrastructure	 and	 mechanisms	 for	 various	 market	
arrangements	 and	 the	 ways	 that	 forest	 commodities	 travel	 across	 the	 commodity	 chain.	
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unfortunately,	 the	 formal	 banking	 institutions	 are	 still	 unwilling	 to	 fund	 small-scale	 community	
ventures,	especially	for	businesses	with	small-scale	plantations	like	the	Nutmeg	Dusung.	This	paper	
explores	ways	in	which	market	exchanges	affect	rural	agroforestry	farmers,	and	thus	affect	various	
landscapes.	
As	 a	 form	 of	 land	 management	 considered	 community	 forestry,	 nutmeg	 farmers	 have	
developed	the	Dusung	system	with	 little	 formal	education	and	knowledge	of	markets.	The	weak	
financial	management	services	and	marketing	systems	for	nutmeg	in	the	Moluccas	 is	one	reason	
farmers	 have	become	 involved	 in	 a	 system	of	 debt	 bondage	 known	 locally	 as	 the	 (ijon)	 system.	
Research	 about	 the	 involvement	 of	 farmers	 in	 the	 ijon	 system	 is	 not	well	 documented	 and	 has	
important	 development	 implications	 in	 an	 era	 that	 prioritizes	 social	 forestry	 policies.	 For	 that	
reason,	this	study	aims	to	explain	nutmeg	farmer	involvement	in	a	form	of	bonded	labor,	which	can	
be	considered	a	"tree	mortgage	system."	Collecting	information	and	building	knowledge	around	the	
reasons	and	processes	 for	 farmer	 involvement	 in	 the	Dusung	nutmeg	 tree	mortgage	system	can	
support	 in	 development	 efforts	 to	 empower	 communities	 and	provide	more	 equitable	 terms	 to	
those	living	around	the	forest.	
2.	Materials	and	Methods	 	
This	research	was	conducted	in	the	village	of	Hutumuri,	Salahutu	District,	Moluccas	province.	 	
Hutumuri	village	was	selected	as	the	research	site	because	it	is	a	village	that	has	a	high	potential	to	
produce	Nutmeg	within	the	Dusung	system.	It	is	also	the	largest	nutmeg	producer	in	the	District	of	
South	Leitimur,	Ambon.	
This	research	uses	a	case	study	method	from	the	Hutumuri	experience,	where	data	collection	
was	 conducted	 through	 in-depth	 interviews	 and	 participant	 observation.	 Interviews	 involved	 15	
owners	 of	 Dusung	 nutmeg	 systems.	 Data	 analysis	 was	 performed	 using	 the	 Principal	 Agent	
Relationship	 Theory	 to	 help	 explain	 relationships	 in	which	 one	 or	more	 persons	 give	 their	 trust	
(Principal)	to	influence	others	as	partners	to	receive	trust	(of	the	Agent)	to	perform	some	tasks	the	
Principal	requires	by	delegating	decision-making	authority	to	the	partner	in	question	(Agent).	This	
relationship	 implies	 either:	 (1)	 problems	 related	 to	 the	 transfer	 of	 ownership	 rights	 (transfer	 of	
rights),	(2)	the	problem	of	a	mismatch	of	information	(asymmetric	information)	in	a	relationship	of	
principal	and	agent,	and	 (3)	 the	emergence	of	 transaction	costs	 (information	costs,	coordination	
costs	and	strategy	cost).	I	chose	this	theory	because	it	helps	to	illustrate	the	relationship	of	interests	
involved	in	the	lending	process	of	capital	that	exist	between	the	owner	of	Dusung	and	those	that	
apply	 the	 Ijon.	 This	 theory	 helps	 explain	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 game	 and	 the	 risks	 that	 both	 parties	
experience	through	this	process.	Principal	agent	theory	herein	especially	highlights	the	unfair	terms	
experienced	by	the	Principal	(Dusung).	 	
3.	Results	and	Discussion	
3.1.	 	 Transfer	of	Rights	 	
Communities	usually	harvest	nutmeg	three	times	a	year:	March-April;	July-August;	December-
January.	Nutmeg	harvests	have	also	developed	a	tree	mortgage	system,	which	was	established	in	
the	 region	a	 long	 time	ago.	The	 tree	mortgage	 system	 is	one	 form	of	an	agreement	established	
between	nutmeg	 farmers	as	principal	 (P)	and	debt	bondage	as	agent	 (A).	The	system	shows	 the	
temporary	 transfer	 of	 rights	 between	 P	 and	 A.	 The	 agreement	 consists	 of	 a	 certain	 number	 of	
nutmeg	trees	used	as	collateral	for	borrowing	money	by	farmers	and	in	turn	bonds	labor	to	that	
venture.	 The	 system	 works	 due	 to	 the	 economic	 disadvantages	 and	 households	 needs	 among	
farmers	(P),	whereby	during	certain	circumstances,	farmers	need	capital	to	finance	various	family	
obligations,	such	as	school	or	college	fees	for	children,	home	improvements,	and	ceremonial	events	
such	as	weddings.	
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Figure	1.	Tree	mortgage	system	diagram	
	
	
	
	 The	tree	mortgage	
system 
• Mortagage	process	lasts	for	1	year	(can	be	
2	times	harvest)	
•	The	nutmeg	dusung	asessment	is	arranged	
by	a	bond	
•	The	whole	of	the	harvest	becomes	the	right	
of	a	bond	
• The	harvests	made	at	that	time	will	be	
assessed	in	accordance	with	the	value	of	
the	loan	and	if	less	than	the	value	of	the	
loan	then	the	mortgage	process	will	
continue	again	until	the	total	value	of	all	
outstanding	loans	is	returned	
	
General	requirement	
Mortgage	Season  
1. Survey	of	tree	condition	
- diamater	(Ø)	
10	–	15	cm,	23	–	30	cm	&	48	-50	
cm	
- High	 	 >	7	meter	
1. Number	of	tree	 	 30	-	40	tree,	rated	at	 	
Rp	3.000.000	-	4.000.000.	
2. Number	of	tree	100	tree,	 	 rated	at	
5.000.000	–	Rp	10.000.000.-	
The	Annual	Mortgage  
• The	mortgage	process	takes	place	
only	on	1st	harvest	time	(usually	the	
harvest	that	occurred	in	July-August)	
•	 	 The	whole	of	the	harvest	becomes	
the	right	of	a	bond.	
• The	harvests	made	at	that	time	will	be	
assessed	in	accordance	with	the	value	
of	the	loan	and	if	less	than	the	value	of	
the	loan	then	the	mortgage	process	
will	continue	again	until	the	total	value	
of	all	outstanding	loans	is	returned	
	
	
	
Forest and Society. Vol. 1(2): 137-143, November 2017 140 
 
The	tree	mortgage	system	is	described	as	follows:	
1) The	two	sides,	both	farmers	and	ijon	know	each	other	well	and	sometimes	have	family	ties	so	
it	requires	no	physical	evidence	(letter	loan)	which	binds	both	parties.	Mutual	trust	between	
the	two	sides	forms	a	major	asset	in	this	pledge	system.	
2) There	are	2	other	forms	of	the	tree	mortgage	system,	namely:	
a. The	annual	mortgage,	which	is	an	agreement	where	the	trees	are	mortgaged	as	collateral	
for	≥	1	year	according	to	the	agreement	that	was	built.	The	annual	pledge	requirements	
as	follows:	
- Ijon	will	 survey	 the	physical	 condition	of	 trees	 (diameter	 and	height)	 as	well	 as	 the	
number	of	trees	to	forecast	its	value	as	collateral	for	the	loan	.	
- During	the	mortgage	time,	the	process	of	maintenance	and	harvesting	is	fully	arranged	
by	 ijon.	 Maintenance	 tasks	 can	 be	 performed	 together	 or	 not,	 depending	 on	 the	
agreement.	Sometimes	ijon	hires	special	labor	to	nurture	the	trees	or	work	alongside	
the	tree	owner.	
- During	harvest,	when	yields	exceed	the	value	of	the	loan,	then	the	ijon	receive	windfall	
advantages,	and	when	yields	are	less	than	the	value	of	the	loan	ijon	will	incur	a	loss.	
- Farmers	entitled	to	participate	in	the	harvesting	process	fully	pay	the	ijon	during	the	
harvest	period.	
b. Mortgage	season,	is	a	tree	mortgage	agreement	applicable	at	the	time	of	great	harvest	.	
Terms	of	the	mortgage	seasons	are	as	follows:	
- In	general,	the	main	requirement	is	not	much	different	from	an	annual	mortgage.	The	
difference	 is	 that	 a	 tree	 used	 as	 collateral	 mortgage	 is	 only	 valid	 during	 the	 great	
harvest.	 For	 Nutmeg	Dusung,	 large	 harvests	with	 plentiful	 good	 quality	 fruits	 occur	
during	the	rainy	season	(July-August).	
- During	the	great	harvest	season,	all	yields	become	fully	ijon	rights	and	if	the	result	is	
less	than	the	value	of	loans	that	have	been	received	by	the	farmer,	the	mortgaged	trees	
remain	valid	for	the	next	harvest	in	order	to	cover	the	value	of	the	loan.	However,	when	
the	 result	 exceeds	 the	value	of	 the	 loan,	 the	deal	 is	only	 valid	 at	 that	 time	and	 the	
advantage	is	for	the	ijon.	
- Farmers	entitled	to	participate	in	the	process	of	harvesting	will	be	fully	paid	by	the	debt	
to	ijon	during	the	harvest	period.	
3.2.	 	 Asymmetric	Information	
Relationships	that	develop	in	the	tree	mortgage	system	between	nutmeg	farmers	as	P	and	ijon	
as	A	has	led	to	asymmetric	information.	In	other	words,	a	mismatch	in	available	information	takes	
place	 because	 A	 exploits	 their	 advantages	 about	 nutmeg	marketing	 prospects.	 This	 can	 happen	
because	the	marketing	and	determination	of	nutmeg	selling	price	is	fully	controlled	by	A.	P	trusts,	
or	rather	has	no	option	to	trust,	the	nutmeg	market	distribution	process	conducted	by	A.	Almost	all	
information	on	the	management	and	marketing	of	the	Dusung	is	controlled	by	A.	This	also	creates	
a	moral	hazard	by	A	because	although	they	strongly	control	 the	outcomes,	 they	are	also	able	to	
neglect	maintenance	and	security	of	Dusung.	Therefore,	Dusung	can	seem	poorly	maintained	during	
the	contract	period.	If	A	enforces	these	coercive	terms,	the	final	harvest	also	suffers,	and	in	turn	P	
is	 likely	 to	 receive	unfair	 shares	 from	selling	prices	of	 the	prevailing	harvest.	 In	accordance	with	
(Petrie,	2002),	agency	theory	has	focused	on	issues	of	asymmetric	information,	where	the	agent	has	
more	 information	about	 the	actual	performance,	motivation,	and	goal,	which	potentially	creates	
moral	hazards	and	adverse	selection.	The	principal	themselves	should	have	opportunities	to	better	
determne	the	costs	of	monitoring	the	performance	of	A	and	establishing	incentives	structure	and	
efficient	monitoring.	
One	of	the	rules	in	the	tree	mortgage	system	agreed	upon	between	P	and	A	is	the	maintenance	
process,	which	until	the	time	of	harvest	is	organized	completely	by	A.	However,	this	form	of	rights	
transfer	may	put	farmers	in	a	weak	position,	especially	in	the	event	that	trees	are	attacked	by	pests	
or	 incur	diseases.	 In	such	a	scenario,	the	responsibility	for	treatment	falls	on	P,	while	A	does	not	
have	to	bear	the	longer	term	consequences	in	this	matter.	This	further	indicates	that	P	incurs	higher	
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risks	compared	to	A,	which	could	simply	ignore	the	investment,	break	promises,	or	find	other	ways	
to	get	out	of	the	agreement.	In	the	tree	mortgage	system	there	is	rarely	any	contract	letter	signed	
between	P	and	A.	Rather,	it	is	based	on	trust	and	a	sense	of	dependency	between	the	two	parties.	
This	can	cause	opportunistic	attitudes	among	one	of	 the	parties,	who	can	change	the	terms	and	
violate	an	agreement	that	has	already	been	negotiated.	
3.3.	 	 Transaction	Cost	
Transaction	costs	are	incurred	when	nutmeg	farmers	as	P	put	their	trust	in	ijon	as	A,	where	P	
and	A	 held	 the	 exchange	 of	 their	 rights	 and	mutual	 desires	 to	 enforce	 the	 exclusive	 rights.	 The	
Relationship	between	P	and	A	would	be	more	efficient	if	there	were	also	a	greater	balance	in	the	
level	of	reward,	as	well	as	a	more	honest	discussion	about	the	ways	to	minimize	transaction	costs	
related	to	the	tree	mortgage	system.	 	 	
In	this	tree	mortgage	system,	P	takes	on	a	much	larger	percentage	of	the	risk	than	A.	The	risk	
is	an	accumulation	of	the	work	performance	conducted	by	A	and	the	supervision	is	carried	out	by	P.	
When	A	commits	unfair	practices	 toward	their	agreement,	which	 is	 then	 followed	by	the	 lack	of	
informed	supervision	by	P,	then	P	takes	on	risks	that	are	difficult	to	foresee.	Therefore,	P	cannot	
fulfill	production	results	as	may	have	been	anticipated.	Therefore,	the	working	performance	of	A	
and	supervision	of	P	greatly	affects	the	final	result	in	the	management	of	Dusung.	
The	emergence	of	the	transaction	costs	for	any	coordination	process	cannot	be	separated	from	
a	marketing	 system	 that	 is	 fully	 controlled	 by	 A.	When	 a	 tree	mortgage	 system	 is	 put	 in	 place,	
generally	 every	 month	 P	 will	 meet	 to	 coordinate	 with	 A.	 Coordination	 is	 conducted	 to	 discuss	
Dusung	conditions	and	allows	the	opportunity	to	determine	appropriate	harvest	time.	This	implies	
P	incurring	coordination	costs	every	month.	
Information	costs	will	be	incurred	by	both	parties,	P	and	A.	However,	P	has	more	control	upon	
the	information,	especially	about	the	marketing	products	of	Nutmeg	Dusung.	On	the	other	hand,	A	
does	 not	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 access	 this	 information.	 The	presence	of	 a	 local	 cooperative	would	
greatly	improve	the	situation	for	P	because	they	could	better	negotiate	the	terms	and	give	greater	
weight	to	P’s	role	in	the	transaction.	This	would	also	result	in	better	Dusung	management	and	likely	
imorive	harvests.	The	absence	of	such	institutions	however,	results	in	power	and	resources	better	
controlled	by	A.	Therefore	A	is	able	to	expend	strategic	costs	to	secure	maximize	short	term	gains	
in	their	business	ventures.	
3.4.	 	 	 Improving	Contracts	in	the	Tree	mortgage	system	 	
To	avoid	the	risks	associated	with	agency	theory,	or	the	unfair	weighting	of	power	to	A,	the	
nutmeg	 farmers	 as	 P	 and	 ijon	 as	 A	 could	 try	 to	 improve	 conditions	 by	 reducing	 overall	 risks	 to	
mortgage	 system	 implementation.	Risks	by	P	and	A	are	 jointly	 incurred	because	 the	 contractual	
mortgage	system	 is	not	designed	 to	maximize	harvest	opportunity.	The	 tree	mortgage	system	 is	
skewed	in	favor	of	A,	and	A	has	lesser	stake	and	knowledge	in	protecting	the	Dusung.	Case	in	point	
that	shows	the	favorable	terms	to	A	is	that	if	the	yield	is	less	than	the	value	of	P’s	loan,	then	the	tree	
mortgage	remains	valid	for	the	upcoming	harvest	to	cover	the	P’s	loan	shortage.	However,	 if	the	
yield	exceeds	P’s	loan	value,	then	the	deal	is	valid	only	at	the	time	of	the	harvest,	thus	providing	full	
advantages	to	A.	Any	reformulation	of	the	mortgage	contract	system	should	pay	special	attention	
to	 these	 arrangements	 in	 order	 to	 highlight	 the	 unequal	 terms	 under	 conditions	 of	 payment	
shortages	 or	 excess	 harvest.	 According	 to	 (Zubayr,	 Darusman,	 Nugroho,	 &	 Nurrochmat,	 2014)	
improving	process	contracts	should	be	performed	if	P	wants	to	reduce	their	risks.	
Determining	the	optimal	written	contract	could	be	one	way	to	increase	clarity	on	the	terms,	
rights	 and	 obligations	 between	 P	 and	 A.	 The	 contractual	 relationship	 between	 P	 and	 A	 could	
guarantee	that	P	gains	greater	 incentives	from	Dusung	management	activities,	especially	as	such	
efforts	 take	 place	 over	 many	 years.	 P	 could	 also	 highlight	 contractual	 arrangements	 and	 other	
strategies	to	modify	the	behavior	of	A.	To	design	an	efficient	P-A	relationship,	a	contract	should	be	
self-enforcing,	 whereby	 it	 would	 take	 action	 against	 or	 suppress	 overly	 opportunistic	 behavior	
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common	among	A	in	the	current	situation.	Such	measures	would	help	to	ensure	compliance	over	
expectations	by	P	towards	A.	 	
We	therefore	suggest	three	ways	that	P	could	design	an	efficient	and	self-enforcing	contract	to	
limit	unequal	power	sharing	between	P	and	A:	
a. P	can	work	to	carefully	filter	out	the	different	A	known	to	enforce	excessive	or	unfair	dealings.	In	
this	case,	P	would	identify	who	will	work	with	them,	and	P	could	work	together	to	only	work	with	
eligible	A.	
b. P	can	monitor	A	activities,	such	as	assessing	the	terms	and	the	different	benefits	between	parties.	
When	the	mortgage	system	is	established,	all	access	to	dusung	is	fully	controlled	by	A	and	in	turn	
places	P	in	a	more	equal	position.	
c. P	can	draw	up	contractual	terms	that	can	increase	the	credibility	of	the	relationship	between	P	
and	A.	Articulating	these	terms	at	the	outset	allows	them	to	be	written	down,	signed,	and	thus	
self-enforcing.	 Furthermore,	 it	 can	 also	 include	 penalties	 for	 wrongdoing,	 and	 reward	
agreements	in	the	event	of	windfall	profits.	
In	 addition	 to	 improving	 the	mortgage	 tree	 system,	 complementary	 strengthening	 of	 local	
institutions	would	provide	a	much	needed	facilitation	role.	The	lack	of	nutmeg	farmers	bargaining	
position	 in	 the	Hutumuri	 village	 is	 inseparable	 from	 the	 lack	 of	 cooperatives	 that	 can	 help	with	
product	collection	and	marketing.	This	is	one	of	the	central	reasons	why	farmers	are	increasingly	
dependent	 on	 the	 ijon,	 because	 they	 do	 not	 have	 the	 option	 to	 sell	 their	 products	 and	 access	
markets	elsewhere.	Breaks	in	this	supply	chain	and	lack	of	market	information	also	disadvantages	
the	farmer	position.	Moreover,	the	absence	of	organizational	support	for	farmers	and	other	parties	
related	 to	 the	 bargaining	 position	 of	 farmers	 is	 very	 low.	 According	 to	 (Febryano,	 Suharjito,	
Darusman,	Kusmana,	&	Hidayat,	2014)	collaboration	between	local	institutions,	local	NGOs,	national	
and	international	universities,	research	institutions,	private	companies	through	CSR,	and	others	can	
improve	 the	 bargaining	 position	 of	 local	 farmers	 and	 their	 institutions,	 and	 could	 advocate	 to	
encourage	local	government	policies	that	favor	local	farmer	institutions.	
Increasing	the	bargaining	position	of	nutmeg	farmers	will	also	encourage	the	sustainability	of	
forest	 resources.	 Dusung	 management	 systems	 have	 historically	 performed	 well	 to	 protect	
resources.	 Weakening	 their	 stakes	 in	 the	 management	 of	 the	 Dusung	 as	 indicative	 in	 the	 ijon	
relationship	described	above	could	further	weaken	the	overall	ecological	system.	Studies	conducted	
by	(Salampessy,	Bone,	&	Febryano,	2012)	in	the	villages	of	Soya	(Ambon	Island),	Alang	(Ceram),	and	
Paperu	Booi	 (Saparua)	 shows	 how	dusung	with	 nutmeg	have	 various	 other	 benefits	 in	 terms	of	
economic	 development	 and	 environmental	 management.	 Dusung	 with	 nutmeg	 and	 their	
performance	at	all	these	locations	showed	that:	(1)	productivity	and	cost	structure	of	nutmeg	farmer	
income	 correlates	 with	 the	 number	 of	 cultivated	 plants;	 (2)	 cultivation	 and	 security	 efforts	
undertaken	 by	 the	 owner	 with	 the	 help	 of	 Kewang	 (traditional	 forest	 police)	 indicates	 the	
orientation	toward	productivity	and	sustainability;	(3)	community	priorities	in	managing	Dusung	are	
for	 commercial	 purposes,	 especially	 for	 nutmeg	 and	 clove,	 while	 interspersing	 vegetables	 for	
subsistence	purposes;	and	(4)	cultivation	of	Dusung	are	relatively	efficient	in	their	ratio	of	input	and	
output	 production.	 Furthermore,	 from	 an	 institutional	 perspective,	 rights	 relating	 to	 ownership,	
control,	management	and	the	existence	of	co-management	arrangements	between	Dusung	proved	
beneficial	to	owners,	managers,	harvesters	and	their	communities.	
4.	Conclusion	 	
Relations	 between	 nutmeg	 farmers	 and	 ijon	 in	 the	 tree	 mortgage	 system	 shows	 the	
implications	of	the	current	conditions	of	changing	relations,	especially	in	the	temporary	transfer	of	
rights	from	the	farmer	to	ijon.	Asymmetric	 information	has	perpetuated	debt	bondage	to	exploit	
opportunities	 for	profit	accumulation	among	the	 ijon.	Their	additional	access	to	 information	and	
marketing	advantage	privileges	them	in	the	profits	from	nutmeg	over	the	farmers.	Improving	system	
contracts	for	tree	mortgage,	as	shown	in	this	paper,	could	help	to	emphasize	the	cultivation	issues	
in	the	context	of	marketing	concerns.	Strengthening	local	institutions	is	also	one	way	to	improve	the	
bargaining	 position	of	 nutmeg	 farmers	 and	 encourage	 sustainability	 of	 forest	 resources	 through	
Dusung	nutmeg	agroforesty	systems,	as	has	been	proven	the	case	in	various	other	areas.	
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